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THE LAW APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS: FROM AUTONOMY TO HIERARCHY
YARASLAU KRYVOI*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the law applied by the administrative tribunals
of international organizations when resolving disputes between interna-
tional organizations and international civil servants.  The analysis sug-
gests that international administrative tribunals primarily rely on
employment contracts and internal law of international organizations
while only rarely referencing international law.  This Article argues that
international administrative tribunals should specifically define in their
relevant statutes the sources of law applicable to international adminis-
trative disputes and that they should distinguish such sources from non-
legal norms.  The Article further notes the modern trend of international
administrative tribunals of giving more weight to general principles of
law.  It ultimately argues that these tribunals should establish the
supremacy of international law, particularly fundamental principles of
international labor law, over the internal law of international organiza-
tions.  The establishment of such a hierarchy will make international
administrative law more legitimate, coherent, and predictable.
I. INTRODUCTION
When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute was
drafted, the majority of States considered it impossible to compel
States to submit their disputes to a court of law without specifying
the applicable law.  According to the U.S. member of the drafting
committee, “[I]t [was] inconceivable that a [g]overnment would
agree to allow itself to be arraigned before a court which bases its
sentences on its subjective conceptions of the principles of jus-
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tice.”1  As a result, Article 38 of the ICJ Statute lists the applicable
sources of international law.2  Yet, statutes of most international
administrative tribunals remain silent on the applicable law3 when
resolving employment disputes between international civil servants
and international organizations.4  For example, founding docu-
ments of many international organizations do not even explicitly
mandate that the organizations respect human rights.5
International civil servants are hired, employed, trained, and
fired not in accordance with national labor laws but in accordance
with specially devised legal rules that apply only within a particular
organization.6  The number of people working in an international
organization may rival the number of people living in some small
States,7 and therefore rules regulating international civil servants’
employment are not just a theoretical matter.  Although interna-
tional organizations’ tasks originally included only the preparation
of documents for political meetings, they now engage in a range of
varied activities—from the harmonization of law and the standardi-
1. ADVISORY COMM. OF JURISTS FOR THE EST. OF A PERMANENT COURT OF INT’L JUSTICE,
PROCE`S-VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE, JUNE 16TH–JULY 24TH 1920, at
309 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2006) (1920).
2. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides
that the sources of applicable law include international conventions, international custom,
general principles of law, as well as the judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly
qualified publicist as subsidiary sources for the determination of the rules of law.  Statute of
the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1 U.N.T.S. 993
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
3. See 1 C.F. AMERASINGHE, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE 103–04 (2d
ed. 1994).
4. “International organization” for purposes of this Article means an organization
established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and which pos-
sesses its own international legal personality.  Report of the International Law Commission,
61st Session (4 May–5 June and 6 July–7 August 2009), Draft Articles on the Responsibility
of International Organizations art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/
64/10, at 19 (Sept. 25, 2009).
5. See Anne Peters, The Constitutionalisation of International Organisations, in EUROPE’S
CONSTITUTIONAL MOSAIC 253, 267 (Neil Walker et al. eds., 2011).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. The U.N. International Civil Service Commission developed a common system of
salaries, allowances, and benefits that applies to approximately one hundred thousand staff
members serving at over 650 locations around the world. See UNITED NATIONS INT’L CIVIL
SERV. COMM’N, UNITED NATIONS COMMON SYSTEM OF SALARIES, ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS vi
(2012), available at http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/sal/sabeng12.pdf.  The World Bank
has over nine thousand employees and maintains over one hundred offices across the
globe. FAQs—About the World Bank, WORLD BANK, http://tinyurl.com/5hel2 (last updated
June 2012).
36259-jle_47-2 Sheet No. 9 Side A      04/20/2015   09:46:54
36259-jle_47-2 Sheet No. 9 Side A      04/20/2015   09:46:54
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\47-2\JLE201.txt unknown Seq: 3 17-APR-15 16:12
2015] Hierarchy in International Administrative Law 269
zation of technical rules to international peacekeeping missions
and the temporary administration of sovereign territories.8
Disputes arising out of employment relations between interna-
tional civil servants and international organizations require spe-
cially designated dispute resolution bodies, such as the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Administrative Tribu-
nal,9 the U.N. Dispute Tribunal,10 and the World Bank Administra-
tive Tribunal.11  However, the statutes of these tribunals often do
not contain provisions outlining the applicable law, even though
such tribunals are completely detached from domestic legal sys-
tems.  Rather, these tribunals usually base their analyses solely on
the interpretation of employment contracts or applicable staff reg-
ulations.12  Moreover, international administrative tribunals,
including the ILO Administrative Tribunal, which has one of the
highest caseloads of employment disputes between international
organizations and international civil servants,13 fail to explicitly rec-
ognize the applicability of fundamental ILO conventions to their
decisions.14  Unsurprisingly, scholars point to a low rate of deci-
sions made by international administrative tribunals in favor of
employees.15  Most of these employment disputes are decided on
8. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (establishing the
U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)).
9. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Administrative Tribunal is one of
the oldest tribunals, functioning as a successor to the League of Nations Tribunal.  The
ILO Administrative Tribunal has decided over three thousand cases.  In addition to having
jurisdiction over disputes involving the ILO, the ILO Administrative Tribunal also has juris-
diction over disputes involving employees of other international organizations, such as the
World Health Organization, the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
and nearly sixty other organizations. See Membership, INT’L LAB. ORG., http://www.ilo.org/
tribunal/membership/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
10. The U.N. Dispute Tribunal evaluates complaints from the United Nations and the
U.N. specialized agencies, such as the U.N. General Secretariat, the International Mari-
times Organisation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, and nearly thirty other
entities.  In 2009, the U.N. Dispute Tribunal replaced the U.N. Administrative Tribunal,
which had previously considered such employment disputes between 1949 and 2009. See
U.N. Dispute Tribunal Jurisdiction, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/oaj/dispute/
jurisdiction.shtml (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
11. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank, and several other organi-
zations each maintains its own tribunal.
12. See Matthew Parish, An Essay on the Accountability of International Organizations, 7
INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 277, 285 nn.21, 23 (2010).
13. Id. at 287.
14. Id. at 287 n.31 (explaining that in 2009, none of the cases decided by the World
Bank Administrative Tribunal provided applicants with a substantial award in accordance
with the remedies sought).
15. Id. at 287.
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the basis of written evidence, without discovery, and by judges with-
out tenure who are usually appointed by the same organization
against which an employee has filed a complaint.16  Some scholars
even refer to this system of administrative justice as “a fig leaf of
justice, a woeful pretence of due process.”17
An illustrative example demonstrates the practical implications
of this problem.  Assume that the internal rules of an international
organization provide that only male dependants can benefit from
having their nondependent spouses travel on home leave at the
organization’s expense.18  If a male employee brings a dispute to
the administrative tribunal to cover the travel expenses of his
female dependant, the tribunal will likely decide that the internal
law of the organization should prevail over the general principle of
nondiscrimination because the organization’s rule is more specific.
Such a ruling would clearly contradict the principle of gender non-
discrimination proclaimed in Article 8 of the U.N. Charter,19
numerous human rights instruments,20 and the ILO conventions
and recommendations.21  Yet, the international civil servant cannot
challenge this judgment in the absence of an appeal procedure.  In
other words, a controversial internal regulation prevails over the
internationally recognized principle of nondiscrimination.
This Article explains the need for a hierarchy of sources of law to
avoid situations similar to the one described above.  Specifically,
this Article proposes a hierarchy between international law, includ-
ing general principles of law, and the internal law of international
organizations, in which international law prevails over conflicting
provisions of an international organization’s internal law.  The
16. Id. at 288.
17. Id. at 290.
18. This example is based on the facts of the U.N. Administrative Tribunal’s decision
in Mullan v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 162,
U.N. Doc. AT/DEC/162 (1972).  The U.N. Administrative Tribunal refused to apply the
general principle of nondiscrimination because a specific internal regulation permitted
such discrimination.
19. U.N. Charter art. 8 (“The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligi-
bility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in
its principal and subsidiary organs.”).
20. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pt. II, art. 3, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 173; European Convention on Human Rights art. 14, Nov. 4 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222; American Convention on Human Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.S.
675.
21. See, e.g., Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation pmbl., art. 1, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 32; Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Recommendation, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (June 25, 1958), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312449.
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Article further argues that this proposed hierarchy will help to dis-
tinguish between legal and nonlegal rules that are applicable in
international administrative proceedings and that it will help to
limit administrative discretion—a primary goal of any administra-
tive law.22  A clear normative hierarchy will also enhance the clarity
of the law, increase the coherence of principles and procedures,
and establish the mechanisms needed to fill gaps in existing law.
In order to create such a hierarchy, this Article proposes that
administrative tribunals amend their statutes or change their juris-
prudence to establish a rule that principles of international admin-
istrative law—such as nondiscrimination, nonretroactivity,
proportionality, legitimate expectations, and fundamental labor
rights recognized by the ILO—should prevail over conflicting rules
of internal law prescribed by international organizations.
Part II of this Article introduces the concept of international
administrative law and explains how it differs from the traditional
branches of international public law.  Parts III and IV then analyze
the regulations and jurisprudence of various international adminis-
trative tribunals to demonstrate which sources of law these bodies
apply to dispute resolution proceedings.  Next, Part V explains how
the proposed hierarchy between international law and the internal
law of international organizations will enhance legal certainty,
equality of the parties, and overall legitimacy of international
administrative law.  Lastly, Part VI briefly concludes by describing
how to transform the idea of normative hierarchy into practice.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
International administrative law23 initially developed following
the creation of the League of Nations Administrative Tribunal in
the 1920s.24  This branch of international public law determines
the rights and obligations of international civil servants in their
dealings with public bodies, primarily intergovernmental organiza-
22. See generally DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFI-
CIAL DISCRETION (1990) (analyzing the extent to which legal values and institutions can be
and are used to constrain the exercise of administrative discretion).
23. International administrative law should not be confused with global administra-
tive law.  Global administrative law is a relatively new concept much wider in scope than
international administrative law.  It comprises “the mechanisms, principles, practices, and
supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of
global administrative bodies” including rulemaking, administrative adjudication between
competing interests, and other forms of regulatory and administrative decision and man-
agement.  Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005).
24. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 49–53. R
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tions.25  International administrative law imposes restraints on the
exercise of power by international organizations vis-a`-vis interna-
tional civil servants providing accountability and legitimacy for the
exercise of public power.26
The structure, scope, and content of administrative regulations
appear surprisingly similar from one organization to another.
International administrative regulations typically provide for the
right of international civil servants to appear before international
administrative tribunals and extend these tribunals’ jurisdiction
over disputes involving alleged violations of employment contracts
or terms of appointment.27  In addition, most statutes of interna-
tional administrative tribunals and their rules of procedure
describe in detail the composition of the administrative tribunals
and their obligation to act independently and impartially.28  These
statutes usually confer on the relevant body the power to render
binding judgments.29
Although the phrase international administrative law is well estab-
lished in academic literature, the phrase may be somewhat mislead-
ing.  Unlike States, which usually benefit from restricted immunity,
international organizations enjoy absolute immunity,30 and inter-
national civil servants employed by international institutions are
therefore generally precluded from filing complaints in national
courts against their employer organizations.31  As a result, proce-
dures of administrative tribunals often resemble court proceedings
involving employment law rather than traditional administrative
reviews.  Furthermore, an international organization can prevent
25. Id.
26. Armin von Bogdandy et al., Developing the Publicness of Public International Law:
Towards a Legal Framework of for Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1375, 1380
(2008).
27. See, e.g., Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organ-
ization, adopted Oct. 9, 1946, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS 31 (C.F. Amerasinghe ed., 1989); European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, Administrative Tribunal Statute and Rules of Procedure, available at http://www
.ebrd.com/downloads/integrity/appeals.pdf.
28. See Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organiza-
tion, supra note 27. R
29. See id.
30. Accountability of International Organisations for Human Rights Violations, ¶¶ 28–39, at
9–13, Doc. No. 13370 (Dec. 17, 2013), available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/
Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=20310.
31. See, e.g., Appellant v. European Bank for Reconstruction & Development, Case
No. 2006/AT/04, Decision on Remedy and Judgement (European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion & Dev. Apr. 4, 2007).
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another court from scrutinizing an international administrative tri-
bunal decision by simply asserting immunity from jurisdiction.32
International administrative law bears a number of distinctive
conceptual features compared to traditional branches of public
international law, such as international labor law.  Unlike interna-
tional administrative law, the primary instruments of international
labor law include international conventions and recommenda-
tions,33 case law of ILO committees,34 and fundamental principles
contained in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work.35  However, each of these sources only regulates
the conduct of States, and in order for international labor stan-
dards to bind private parties, States must actually implement such
standards by means of domestic legislation.36  Unlike international
labor law, however, international administrative law does not have
a basis in any domestic legal system and actually creates rights and
obligations that directly bind private individuals and intergovern-
mental organizations.37  In a sense then, international administra-
tive law represents a completely autonomous form of international
labor regulation as it does not require implementing domestic
legislation.
International administrative law also differs from other interna-
tional dispute resolution regimes, such as international human
rights law and international investment law where individuals bring
direct claims against subjects of public international law, such as
States.  Similar to international human rights law, international
administrative law involves disputes between private actors and sub-
jects of public international law.  International administrative law
also engages disputes, which arise out of an exercise of public
authority by a subject of international law.  However, unlike inter-
national human rights law, international administrative law does
32. The purpose of the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by international organiza-
tions is to preserve the independence of international organizations and international civil
servants and to protect them from any undue interference by the host State.  Isabelle Pin-
gel-Lenuzza & Emanuel Gaillard, International Organisation and Immunity from Jurisdiction: To
Restrict or to Bypass, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (2002).
33. See Franz Christian Ebert & Claire La Hovary, Labour Law, International, MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 4, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e957? (last updated Jan. 2013).
34. See, e.g., ILO, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION—DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF
THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE OF THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE ILO (4th rev.
ed. 1996).
35. See ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Int’l Labour Con-
ference, 86th Sess., Geneva (June 1998).
36. MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 129–39 (2008).
37. See, generally AMERASINGHE, supra note 3. R
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not directly intersect with domestic legal systems.  The system of
international human rights law, such as the European Convention
of Human Rights, usually serves as a next step after exhausting all
remedies in domestic litigation,38 while intergovernmental organi-
zations are typically immune entirely from jurisdiction in domestic
courts.39  As a result, if an individual sought to enforce the judg-
ment of an international administrative tribunal in a national
court, an international organization would likely respond by assert-
ing an immunity defense.40
As many conceptual issues of international administrative law
remain unaddressed, cross-regime comparisons with other fields,
such as international investment law, international human rights
law, or the emerging principles of European administrative law,
could prove useful.  One must understand, however, that interna-
tional administrative law represents a unique self-contained system
that must be distinguished from other international legal
regimes.41  A full understanding of this system requires a detailed
examination of international administrative law, its sources, and its
relationship with general international law.
III. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. The Concept of Sources of Law
In its 2004 report on the accountability of international organi-
zations, the International Law Association recommended that
international administrative tribunals refrain from adopting too
restrictive an approach toward the sources of law at the tribunals’
disposal.42  Nevertheless, it appears that the opposite problem is
38. SHAW, supra note 36, at 273. R
39. Id.
40. In practice, international organizations almost always respect judgments of such
tribunals. C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS 793 (2005).
41. In a broader sense, self-contained regimes are inter-related wholes of primary and
secondary rules that cover some particular problem differently from the way it would oth-
erwise be covered under general law.  Examples of other self-contained regimes include
World Trade Organization law or the laws of diplomatic protection. See generally Rep. of
the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversifi-
cation and Expansion of International Law, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, at 65–69 (Apr. 13, 2006).
42. INT’L LAW ASS’N, BERLIN CONFERENCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS, FINAL REPORT 48 (2004), available at http://tinyurl.com/n6fk5pa.
36259-jle_47-2 Sheet No. 12 Side A      04/20/2015   09:46:54
36259-jle_47-2 Sheet No. 12 Side A      04/20/2015   09:46:54
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\47-2\JLE201.txt unknown Seq: 9 17-APR-15 16:12
2015] Hierarchy in International Administrative Law 275
more serious, namely the lack of clarity on the applicable law gov-
erning decision making in international administrative law.43
According to the concept of sources of law, law is determined by
its source and ultimately boils down to a pedigree test.44  The very
term law helps to avoid replacing usual binding norms with non-
binding arrangements.  The notion of sources of law presumes an
exhaustive statement of the ways in which law can be established
and changed.45  The concept aims to ensure stability and certainty
in the ascertainment of law.
Early positivists rooted the source theory in authority.46  Accord-
ing to this construction, in order to ascertain a rule of law, one had
to identify the authority of the legal norm’s origin.47  Later posi-
tivists believed that legal rules derived from social conventions
rather than authority.48  Yet, other schools of thought argued for
the process-based identification of law, emphasizing the role of
sociopolitical factors in blurring the distinction between law and
nonlaw.49  However, positivism remains the only school that refers
to the structural foundation of law without referring to subjective
perceptions, such as policy, liberalism, or feminism.50
43. Most existing international dispute resolution regimes require that the tribunal
render decisions on the basis of an applicable law.  For example, under rules of the Inter-
national Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the failure to apply appli-
cable substantive law may constitute an excess of powers and lead to annulment of the
award.  Convention on the Settlements of Investment Disputes Between States and Nation-
als of Other States art. 52(1)(b), adopted Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1965).  As a
further example, the ad hoc committee in Klo¨ckner v. Cameroon decided that the tribunal
manifestly exceeded its powers when the award’s reasoning seemed more like a reference
to equity, rather than the agreed-upon applicable law of a Contracting State.  Klo¨ckner v.
Cameroon, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Decision, 2 ICSID Reports 124 (1994).  In the com-
mercial arbitration context, failure to comply with applicable law may result in the setting
aside of an arbitral award under the New York Convention.  Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 3.  However, in international administrative law, the notion of applicable law plays
a more modest role, if any.
44. JEAN D’ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26
(2011).
45. See H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 39
(1972).
46. See D’ASPREMONT, supra note 44, at 41. R
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Hans Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism and International Law, 34 AM. J.
INT’L L. 260, 261–62 (1940). See generally HAROLD LASSWELL & MYRES MCDOUGAL, JURISPRU-
DENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (1992) (providing an over-
view of theories of law).
50. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2008).
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The question of legitimacy underpins the debate regarding
sources of international administrative law.  As with any other legal
model, international administrative law should be legitimate.  Stan-
dard features legitimizing legal systems include public accountabil-
ity for the legislative process, public consultations, and media
debates that shape national labor laws in democratic countries.
International organizations, however, function in a different con-
text.  As extraterritorial autonomous bodies, intergovernmental
organizations lack the same level of democratic legitimacy charac-
teristic of their national equivalents.
Additionally, the hierarchical review of higher courts, public
opinion, and the professional reputation of administrators and reg-
ulators limit any discretion in the implementation of national law.
Nonetheless, these controls do not exist in international adminis-
trative law.51  Unlike other international dispute resolution regimes
or domestic legal systems, the international administrative legal sys-
tem remains truly self-contained.  This weakens the link with the
original source of power, the State.  Moreover, civil society involve-
ment is not available to the same extent as in a domestic setting
because international organizations are detached from the domes-
tic context.  In the absence of an effective and fair dispute resolu-
tion procedure, the threat of leaving the organization may remain
the only option for international civil servants.
According to Ru¨diger Wolfrum, authority in an international
context can be legitimized through its original source of power
(for instance, the consent of States to international treaties),
through the use of fair and adequate procedures, or by satisfactory
outcomes in its decisions.52  Therefore, to remain legitimate and
accountable, international organizations must subject themselves
to the rule of law.  It is important to establish a hierarchy of inter-
national law for international organizations through which all acts
conform to the organization’s constituent treaty or founding act.53
51. In most jurisdictions, administrative dispute resolution decisions are subject to
judicial review. See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN & PETER LINDSETH, COMPARATIVE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 5 (2010).
52. Ru¨diger Wolfrum, Legitimacy of International Law and the Exercise of Administrative
Functions: The Example of the International Seabed Authority, the International Maritime Organisa-
tion (IMO) and International Fisheries Organisations, in THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 917, 919 (Armin von Bogandy et al. eds., 2010).
53. See Peters, supra note 5, at 266. R
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Finally, an international administrative tribunal’s primary task is
to apply the law to disputes, not to create law.54  The ICJ in the
Fisheries Jurisdiction case explained that a court of law “cannot antic-
ipate the law before the legislator has laid it down.”55  The tribu-
nals were not established to function as lawmakers56 but rather as
adjudicators with their powers restricted by international law.
B. Importance of Defining Sources of Law
Every legal system aims to predict the conduct of other parties
and distinguish between permissible and impermissible conduct.57
Some scholars argue that it is more important for a rule of law to
be certain rather than just.58  Yet, those engaged in international
administrative legal disputes may find it difficult to build expecta-
tions regarding their rights and obligations.  In the absence of stip-
ulated sources of law, it remains difficult to establish coherent,
noncontradictory rules that can be predicted and reasonably
followed.
In addition to increasing the legitimacy of international adminis-
trative law already discussed above,59 a clarification of the sources
of law applicable in international administrative proceedings and
the establishment of a normative hierarchy will also make interna-
tional administrative law more predictable.  Predictability in the
law is imperative, as it remains unreasonable to leave to one’s judg-
ment the decision of whether a court will approve certain actions.60
As the ICJ observed in the Gulf of Maine case, legal regulation is
produced by “any convincing demonstration of the existence of the
rules that each had hoped to find established by international law”
rather than by “preconceived assertions.”61  Similarly, Lion Fuller
argued that law should correspond to the requirements of public-
54. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMU-
NITY 373–74 (1933).
55. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Merits, 1974 I.C.J. 1, ¶¶ 23–24 (July 25).
56. Jan Wouters & Philip De Man, International Organizations as Law-Makers, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 190 (Jan Klabbers &
A˚sa Wallendah eds., 2011).
57. LARS VINX, HANS KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW: LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 43
(2007).
58. H.W.R. Wade, The Concept of Legal Certainty: A Preliminary Skirmish, 4 MOD. L. REV.
183, 187 (1941).  Ludwig von Mises famously wrote, “The worst law is better than bureau-
cratic tyranny.” LUDWIG VON MISES, BUREAUCRACY 76 (1946).
59. See supra Part III.A.
60. Lutz-Christian Wolff, Law and Flexibility—Rule of Law Limits of a Rhetorical Silver
Bullet, 11 J. JURIS. 549, 553 (2011).
61. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 246, 298 (Oct. 12).
36259-jle_47-2 Sheet No. 13 Side B      04/20/2015   09:46:54
36259-jle_47-2 Sheet No. 13 Side B      04/20/2015   09:46:54
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\47-2\JLE201.txt unknown Seq: 12 17-APR-15 16:12
278 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 47
ity, nonretroactivity, clarity, consistency, and noncontradiction and
that the actual administration of law should be congruent with the
“rules as announced.”62  Indeed, law represents equilibrium
between certainty and justice, and it is important to leave the dis-
cretionary element within the narrowest possible limits.63
Additionally, every legal system must have clear criteria separat-
ing legal norms from politically desirable rules or moral rules of
courtesy.64  Otherwise, the absence of such criteria may facilitate a
decline in the normative power of the law.65  In the past, parties in
international dispute resolution have invoked various notions rang-
ing from class interest to democracy and human rights in efforts to
manipulate international law.66  Therefore, it is important to distin-
guish between binding legal norms and other social regulators,
such as morality, religion, or political necessity.67  Greater trans-
parency in the decision-making process and rules outlining the
hierarchy of international administrative legal sources will help
address accountability and legitimacy problems.
The absence of clear applicable law also affects the equality
enjoyed by civil servants vis-a`-vis their employers.  According to
Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribu-
nals.”68  The U.N. Human Rights Committee noted in Perterer v.
Austria that the guarantee of equality before courts under Article
14(1) encompasses impartiality, fairness, and equality of arms
regardless of whether a particular judicial body is specifically
tasked with imposing disciplinary measures on civil servants.69
While international organizations usually staff their legal depart-
ments with experienced experts, international civil servants (partic-
ularly nonlawyers) may lack the ability to understand previous legal
decisions impacting their employment rights or even to access such
62. David Dyzenhaus, Accountability and the Concept of (Global) Administrative Law 13
(Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper 2008/7), available at http://www.iilj.org/pub-
lications/documents/2008-7.Dyzenhaus.pdf (summarizing LION FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW (1969)).
63. Wolff, supra note 60, at 562–63. R
64. G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 16 (1993).
65. Id. at 16–17.
66. Id. at 18.
67. Allain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-Making,
12 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 22, 25 (1988).
68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 20, art. 14(1). R
69. United Nations, Human Rights Comm., 90th Sess., July 9–27, 2007, Communica-
tion No. 1454/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1454/2006, ¶ 7.2, at 17 (Sept. 11, 2007).
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decisions.70  The classical reason behind the separation of employ-
ment law and contract law is to address inequality in an employee’s
bargaining power vis-a`-vis an employer.71  Employees bear the risk
of being exploited by an employer, and employment law attempts
to protect the vulnerable employee from such employer abuse.72
Therefore, vagueness or difficulty in researching employment reg-
ulations places an unsophisticated employee in a difficult position,
even when an employee has access to a staff association specifically
tasked with supporting employee interests.73
The lack of clear standards dictating the hierarchy of applicable
international legal sources also affects international civil servants’
incentive to use such tribunals.  As in any other dispute resolution
system, when the rules are unclear, an individual has little incen-
tive to refer the matter to a tribunal for resolution.74  Political
maneuvering or efforts to maintain the status quo may replace a
legal process that would otherwise lead to an improvement in the
legal system.
Furthermore, in the absence of binding international adminis-
trative legal norms articulated with reasonable clarity, individuals
are unable to know the bounds of legal activity and unable to
adjust their behavior accordingly.  In the United States, statutes
that lack clear standards are deemed “unconstitutionally vague”
and unenforceable.75  According to U.S. constitutional law, notions
70. Rep. of the Joint Inspection Unit on the Administration of Justice at the United
Nations, ¶¶ 136–43, U.N. Doc. A/55/57 (June 12, 2000); August Reinisch & Christina
Knahr, From the United Nations Administrative Tribunal to the United Nations Appeals Tribunal—
Reform of the Administration of Justice System Within the United Nations, 12 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
U.N. L. 447, 452 (2008).
71. See International Labour Conference, 95th Sess., May 31–June 16, 2006, Report
V(1): The Employment Relationship, ¶ 100 (2005) (noting that some legal systems rely on
indicators to identify whether a relationship is one of employment, including “compliance
with the employer’s instructions, being at the employer’s disposal, and socio-economic ine-
quality between the parties”).
72. See generally THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011)
(examining the idea of labor law in the historical context, its purposes, justifications, and
legal bases).
73. JOSE´ MARI´A BENEYTO, ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ¶ 17, at 7 (2013) (“[U]ncertainty as to the precise source of
obligation renders it particularly difficult to define the exact scope of the obligations
incumbent on the international organization.  This is unwelcome from the perspective of
legal certainty—both for the organisations themselves and for third parties.”).  Interna-
tional organizations may nurture or take advantage of uncertainty regarding the applicable
law in order to preserve their freedom of action.
74. THIRLWAY, supra note 45, at 34–35. R
75. If a statute is too vague for the average citizen to understand, the statute is void for
vagueness and unenforceable under the U.S. Constitution.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 970 (4th ed. 2011).
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of fair notice and control of arbitrary enforcement underpin the
vagueness doctrine.  The U.S. Supreme Court explained that a stat-
ute must define the prescribed conduct “with sufficient definite-
ness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement,”76 as arbitrary enforcement violates
the principle of equal protection.77  This logic is equally relevant
within the context of international administrative law.
Lastly, other disciplines, such as political science or sociology,
may marginalize international administrative law in the absence of
rules governing the applicable law.  Therefore, in response to each
of the concerns addressed above, a clarification of the sources of
law applicable in international administrative proceedings will
make the system more predicable, enhance its legitimacy, and help
strike a balance between the interests of international organiza-
tions, their member States, and international civil servants.
IV. SOURCES OF LAW IN THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
In practice, international administrative tribunals rely on several
sources, including the employment contract, internal law of inter-
national organizations, and generally recognized principles of
international administrative law.  Tribunals also sometimes refer to
their own internal law and the jurisprudence of other tribunals78
and occasionally cite to writings of legal scholars.79
76. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also Gillian Hadfield, Weighing
the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 541,
542 (1994) (describing how the relationship between actual liability and official discretion
links the vagueness issues of notice and arbitrary enforcement).
77. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 753 n.3 (1985).  According to the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, known as the Equal Protection Clause, “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. See Hansen Peter Hansen, The World Bank Administrative Tribunals External Sources of
Law: The Next Chapter (2006–2010), 11 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 449, 490–91 (2012)
(discussing reliance on the jurisprudence of other tribunals).
79. Most often, tribunals quote C.F. Amerasinghe to demonstrate the existence of
certain principles of international administrative law.
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A. The Employment Contract
Most international organizations hire civil servants through an
employment contract or a legal act of the organization.80  As a mat-
ter of practice, employment contracts and the internal regulations
of international organizations contain the most detailed provisions
with respect to the rights and obligations of international organiza-
tions and their civil servants.81  Very often in practice, however,
both the letter of appointment and the letter of acceptance collec-
tively constitute the employment contract rather than any single
written document.82  The World Bank Administrative Tribunal in
the de Merode case explained, “The [employment letters] may be
sine qua non of the relationships, but it remains no more than one
of a number of elements which collectively establish the ensemble of
conditions of employment operative between the [international
organization] and its staff members.”83  Similarly, the U.N. Admin-
istrative Tribunal has also observed that the relations between the
United Nations and its staff members are not solely contractual in
nature but also involve statutory elements.84
B. Internal Law of International Organizations
The internal law of international organizations includes constitu-
tions, procedural rules, decisions, regulations, and other enact-
ments adopted by the organization.85  In its judgment in the de
80. While most international organizations use employment contracts, some interna-
tional organizations, most notably the European Union, use statutory employment as a
primary hiring method for international civil servants. JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 244 (2009).
81. See Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53; Darricades v. United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Judgments ILO Admin. Trib. No. 67, at
166 (1963); Kaplan v. Sec’y-General of the United Nations, Judgment No. 19, U.N. Admin.
Trib. 71, 73 (1953); Mortished v. Sec’y-General of the United Nations, Judgment No. 273,
U.N. Admin. Trib. 426, 431 (1981).
82. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, STAFF REGULATIONS AND STAFF RULES ¶
440.3  (2013), available at http://www.who.int/employment/staff_regulations_rules/
EN_staff_regulations_and_staff_rules.pdf.
83. de Merode v. World Bank, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep., Decision No. 1, ¶ 18
(1981).
84. See Howrani v. Sec’y-General of the United Nations, United Nations Appeals Tri-
bunal (UNAT) Judgment No. 4, at 21 (Aug. 25, 1951).
85. Under the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations, “Rules of organiza-
tion” include, in particular, its constituent instruments, relevant decisions, resolutions, and
established practice of the organization.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.
2(j), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also Draft Articles on Responsibility of Interna-
tional Organizations, supra note 4, art. 2(b). R
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Merode case, the World Bank Administrative Tribunal held that in
order to determine the respective rights and duties of the World
Bank and its staff, one must look not only to the Articles of Agree-
ment of the World Bank and its By-Laws but also “to certain manu-
als, circulars, notes and Statements issued by the management of
the [World] Bank as well as to other sources.”86
There is usually a hierarchy of internal laws of international
organizations: constituent instruments (primary law)—often
adopted in the form of international treaties—prevail over staff
regulations87 and staff rules,88 which in turn trump manuals,89 cir-
culars, and similar documents90 (secondary law).91  One must note,
however, that in order for an international administrative tribunal
to regard secondary law as a source of law, the secondary law must
have a general effect.92  In other words, while internal law of inter-
national organizations has the force of general law for other cases
decided by the same tribunal, administrative decisions are applica-
ble only to those individuals whom they address.  Secondary law of
international organizations remains subordinate to the primary law
of international organizations, and in this respect, its relationship
with general international law should be similar to the relationship
between the internal law of States and general international law.
The power to regulate legal relations between international
organizations and their staff through rulemaking is often dele-
gated from the plenary organ of the organization to its administra-
tion.93  Additionally, the instruments establishing international
administrative tribunals provide the tribunals with the power to
86. de Merode, ¶ 18.
87. In the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the Staff Rules define the sta-
tus of staff while Staff Regulations usually prescribe broader principles.
88. See, e.g., RENE-JEAN DUPUY, A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 234
(1988).
89. Although in Robinson the U.N. Secretary-General contended that the Administra-
tive Manual merely constituted a statement of policy without any legal effect whatsoever,
the tribunal disagreed, explaining that “the Administrative Manual, being binding upon
the Administration and the staff, is a document which the Tribunal must apply under the
terms of Article 2 of the Statute,” thus clearly regarding it as a source of law.  Robinson v.
Sec’y-General of the United Nations, Judgments, UNAT Judgment No. 15, at 45–46 (1952).
90. KLABBERS, supra note 80, at 245; M.B. AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOY- R
MENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 68–69 (1967); see also de Merode, at 3.
91. The term secondary law refers to all legal enactments of international organiza-
tions that are not constituent instruments.
92. AKEHURST, supra note 90, at 71. R
93. See, e.g., EUROPEAN ORG. FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH, STAFF RULES AND REGULATIONS,
at ii (11th ed. rev. 2013), available at https://hr-docs.web.cern.ch/hr-docs/srr/StaffRules
AndRegulations.pdf (adopting proposed rules for staff); INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, STAFF
REGULATIONS AND STAFF RULES 1 (2013 ed.), available at https://www.itu.int/en/careers/
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make rules concerning their own procedure and internal organiza-
tion.94  Obviously, in the case of a conflict between these two
sources, the former instruments override the latter.  Nonetheless,
international organizations adopt their internal law on the basis of
constituent documents created by States.95  This suggests that the
internal law of international organizations, relevant resolutions,
and decisions of the organization are entirely distinct from general
public international law created by States.96
As the judges of the ICJ noted, “[T]he fact that an act is done
under authority contained in an instrument which is itself a
treaty . . . does not give the resulting act treaty character.”97  Inter-
nal rules of international organizations cannot be regarded as lex
specialis and overrides general rules of international law for two rea-
sons.98  First, this principle can apply only when both the special
and the general rules have the same subject matter.99  Second, a
“special rule could not prevail over a general unless the two rules
had the same status.”100
Internal regulations of international organizations certainly do
not constitute domestic law of States, but at the same time, such
internal regulations do not constitute a source of international law.
Sources of international law, as illustrated by Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute, usually result only from the interaction of subjects of inter-
national law, such as the conclusion of treaties or state practice,
which crystallizes into international custom.101  Internal regula-
tions create rights and obligations for international organizations
and their employees rather than States and therefore form a sepa-
Documents/SRR-e.pdf; FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, STAFF REGULA-
TIONS ¶ 301.0 (2000), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/X7949e.htm.
94. See, e.g., Statute of the United Nations Appeals Tribunal, art. 6, G.A. Res. 63/253,
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/253, at 10 (Mar. 17, 2009) (telling tribunal to establish its
own rules of procedure); Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International
Labour Organization art. x, adopted Oct. 9, 1946, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 31 (C.F. Amerasinghe ed., 1989).
95. SHAW, supra note 36, at 1303–06. R
96. PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
448 (2009).
97. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.) (Liber. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, 1962
I.C.J. 465, 491 (Dec. 21) (joint dissenting opinion of Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice).
98. See M.B. Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 273, 273 (1975).
99. Summary Records of the 948th Meeting, [1968] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n ¶ 24, at 31,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1968.
100. Id.
101. ICJ Statute, supra note 2, art. 38. R
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rate autonomous legal order from traditional international public
law.102
C. General Principles of Law
In the de Merode judgment, the World Bank Administrative Tribu-
nal, for the first time, extensively discussed the principles of inter-
national administrative law applicable by international
administrative tribunals.  The tribunal explained that in addition
to the internal law of the organization, a wider body of interna-
tional administrative law remains relevant.103  Specifically, the tri-
bunal noted, “Some . . . judgments [of administrative tribunals] . . .
speak of general principles of international civil service law or of a
body of rules applicable to the international civil service.”104
General principles of international administrative law include
principles inherent in any legal order, including domestic law and
international relations105  such as principles of interpretation (for
example, the spirit and object of written provisions, and the inten-
tion of the parties reflected in the travaux preparatoires), principles
concerned with the functioning of the tribunals themselves (for
example, the representation of the parties, time limits for bringing
claims, and measure of damages), and general principles of admin-
istrative law (for example, withdrawal of administrative decisions
and the principle of equality for officials in the same position).106
Increasingly, general principles of law result in not only relations
between States but also relations between States and private
subjects.107
The substance of the “general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations” mentioned in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute differs
from the “general principles of international administrative law.”108
By definition, general principles of public international law out-
lined in Article 38 are those principles recognized in the municipal
102. AMERASINGHE, supra note 40, at 274. R
103. de Merode v. World Bank, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep., Decision No. 1, ¶ 13
(1981).
104. Id. ¶ 28.
105. See Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law—An
Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 28, 28 (Ste-
phan W. Schill ed., 2010).
106. For a more detailed discussion of the classification of general principles of law, see
AKEHURST, supra note 90, at 72–73. R
107. FABIA´N O. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 1–6 (2008).
108. ICJ Statute, supra note 2, art. 38. R
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laws of States.109  However, general principles of international
administrative law develop from the practice of international
administrative tribunals.
It must be noted that case law of other tribunals does not
represent an independent source of law110 but rather a storage of
general principles of international administrative law.  Article
38(d) of the ICJ Statute defines case law and scholarly writings as
subsidiary means of international law, sometimes referred to as
“the store-house,” from which primary rules of international law
can be extracted.111
Some international administrative tribunals recognize general
principles of administrative law as implied terms of employment
contracts.  For example, an ILO Administrative Tribunal in the
Awoyemi explained, “A firm line of precedent says that the rights
under a contract of employment may be express or implied, and
include any that flow from general principles of the international
civil service or human rights.”112  Furthermore, as the ICJ
explained, international organizations, as subjects of international
law, are “bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under
general rules of international law.”113  As organs of international
organizations, international administrative tribunals also have an
obligation to follow public international law.
The drafters of the ICJ Statute intended for the inclusion of gen-
eral principles of law in Article 38 to avoid a finding of non liquet (a
situation where there is no applicable law) by the court.114
Although general principles of law may not always seem specific
enough to create concrete rights and obligations, in an interna-
tional context, such principles may sometimes serve as the only
source of law.  For example, Article 215 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community prescribes that the liability of
the European Community is subject to the “general principles
109. General principles of law mentioned in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute are unwritten
legal norms of wide-ranging character recognized in the municipal laws of States and are
capable of being transposable at the international level.  Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 731, ¶ 254 (Andreas
Zimmerman et al. eds., 2006).
110. Mr. C v. European Bank for Recon. & Dev., Decision No. 01/03, ¶ 54 (Nov. 3–4,
2003).
111. Pellet, supra note 109, ¶ 305. R
112. In re Awoyemi, Judgment, No. 1756, Considerations ¶ 3 (ILO Admin. Trib. July 9,
1998).
113. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the World Health
Organization and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, ¶ 37 (Dec. 20).
114. Pellet, supra note 109, at 765. R
36259-jle_47-2 Sheet No. 17 Side B      04/20/2015   09:46:54
36259-jle_47-2 Sheet No. 17 Side B      04/20/2015   09:46:54
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\47-2\JLE201.txt unknown Seq: 20 17-APR-15 16:12
286 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 47
common to the laws of Member States.”115  In this context, general
principles of E.U. law, such as proportionality, legal certainty, legit-
imate expectations, and equality116 fill in the gaps in E.U. law,
strengthen its coherence, and help avoid the denial of justice.117
An additional example stems from investor-State disputes, which
similar to international administrative law involve private parties
(investors) and subjects of international law (States).118  Tribunals
in such disputes often rely on general principles of law, such as
good faith, restitutio in integrum (an injured person’s duty to miti-
gate damages), and unjust enrichment.119  As these and a number
of other principles are now widely recognized as general principles
of law, they should also serve as a source of law for international
administrative tribunals.
Although each tribunal has its own written regulations and rules,
a number of general principles of international administrative law
have developed over time,120 such as those relating to discrimina-
tion and equality of treatment, procedural and substantive irregu-
larity, and other employment-related issues.121  International
administrative tribunals have also relied on general principles to
develop the procedural law of international adjudication,122 to
115. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 215, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S 11.
116. PAUL CRAIG & GRA´INNE DE BU´RCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 109 (5th
ed. 2011).
117. ALINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 231 (2009).
118. YARASLAU KRYVOI, THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES 17–19 (2012).
119. See Yaraslau Kryvoi, Counterclaims in Investor-State Arbitration, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L.
216, 249–50 (2008).
120. It must be noted that administrative tribunals often share judicial personnel.  For
example, Jan Paulsson serves as Chairman of Administrative Tribunal of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, President of the Administrative Tribunals
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and a member of the
World Bank Administrative Tribunal. Jan Paulsson Biography, ARBITRATION ACADEMY, http:/
/www.arbitrationacademy.org/?page_id=3038 (last visited Dec. 16, 2014).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Ms. M.H. v. Int’l Labour Org., Judgment No. 3182, at 6 (ILO Admin. Trib.
Feb. 6, 2013) (“[T]he discretionary authority of the Director-General in appointment-
related matters is not absolute and has to be exercised within the limits set by the Staff
Regulations and general principles of law.”); Mr. “A” v. Int’l Monetary Fund, Judgment No.
1999-1, ¶ 92 (Admin. Trib. for the Int’l Monetary Fund Aug. 12, 1999) (finding that the
tribunal has an obligation to apply generally recognized principles of international admin-
istrative law in support of the notion that the Administrative Tribunal must exercise juris-
diction over his claim so that it will not escape judicial review); see also Jean-Claude Salle v.
Int’l Bank for Recon. & Dev., Decision No. 10, ¶ 29 (World Bank Admin. Trib. Oct. 8,
1982) (concluding that conditions of employment may also derive from various other
sources, including general principles of law, as the tribunal has determined in de Merode).
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interpret written law as a source of substantive rights and obliga-
tions, and to fill lacunae in regulation.123
In 1929, the League of Nations Tribunal held that “it is only in
the absence . . . of written rules that the Tribunal would be justified
in referring to general principles of law.”124  Subsequently, the ILO
Administrative Tribunal held that general principles of law are sub-
sidiary to internal rules of the ILO.125  Nevertheless, the modern
trend is to give more weight to general principles of law.  Many
statutes establishing international administrative tribunals explic-
itly mention general principles of law, while others remain rather
conservative in their use of general principles and rely primarily on
procedural rules.126  But even when statutes of international
administrative tribunals do not mention general principles of law,
many tribunals nonetheless feel compelled to apply such princi-
ples.127  The legitimacy of general principles as a source of law
depends on whether they are “so widely accepted and well-estab-
lished in different legal systems that they are regarded as generally
applicable to all decisions taken by international organizations.”128
International administrative tribunals often rely on the jurispru-
dence of other tribunals to demonstrate that the application of cer-
tain general principles is not revolutionary.  Decisions of other
123. See, e.g., In re Gubin & Nemo, Judgment No. 429, ¶ 9 (ILO Admin. Trib. Dec. 11,
1980) (“The Tribunal will consider the plea since there is a general principle of law pro-
tecting acquired rights, even in the absence of express provision.”); see also Ms. A.B. v. Int’l
Telecomm. Union, Judgment No. 3156, at 2 (ILO Admin. Trib. Feb. 6, 2013) (addressing
freedom of speech); Mr. P.G.T. v. Int’l Telecomm. Union, Judgment No. 3107, at 9 (ILO
Admin. Trib. July 4, 2012) (recognizing a duty to refrain from conduct that may harm the
dignity or reputation of staff and former staff members); Ms. “B” v. Int’l Monetary Fund,
Judgment No. 1997-2, ¶ 59 (Admin. Trib. for the Int’l Monetary Fund Dec. 23, 1997)
(deciding whether a reasonable notice of the particular change in policy would be
required); Mr. A.G.H. v. European Patent Org., Judgment No. 3195, at 6 (ILO Admin.
Trib. July 4, 2013) (finding that an administrative error must be rectified).
124. AKEHURST, supra note 90, at 74 (quoting League of Nations Tribunal Cases Di R
Palma Castigliona, Pheland, and Maurette).
125. See In re Sharma, Judgment No. 30, at 2 (ILO Admin. Trib. July 13, 1957).
126. See Brian D. Petterson, The Jurisdiction of Discrimination as Opposed to Simple Inequal-
ity in the International Civil Service, 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 15 (2007).
127. See, e.g., Mr. A.J.H.B. v. Int’l Telecomm. Union, Judgment No. 3203, at 10 (ILO
Admin. Trib. Judgment July 4, 2013) (“[G]eneral principles . . . form part of the law of the
international civil service.”) (citing ILO Admin. Trib. Judgment No. 1118); see also Mr. P.A.
v. European Patent Org., Judgment No. 3058, at 5 (ILO Admin. Trib. Feb. 8, 2012) (con-
cluding that the tribunal must apply the relevant rules and regulations and those general
principles of law that govern the relationship between international organizations and
their staff members).
128. See ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, STATUTE OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL: COMMENTARY OF THE STATUTE 18 (2000), available at https:/
/www.imf.org/external/imfat/pdf/2009_Amended-Statute.pdf.
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tribunals do not themselves constitute a source of law; however,
they may serve as evidence of certain general principles.  For exam-
ple, the World Bank Administrative Tribunal in one case applied a
decision from the Asian Development Bank Administrative Tribu-
nal and specifically welcomed “the harmony of views of similar
international jurisdictions,” noting that the tribunal would “be
influenced by persuasive analysis whatever its source.”129
Additionally, the commentary to the statute of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) Administrative Tribunal explains that cer-
tain general principles of international administrative law are “so
widely accepted and well-established in different legal systems that
they are regarded as generally applicable to all decisions taken by
international organizations.”130  The commentary also stated that
“reference to recognized principles of international administrative
law is intended to limit the powers of the tribunal by making clear
that the standards of review applied by the tribunal should not go
beyond those applied by other tribunals.”131  The Asian Develop-
ment Bank Administrative Tribunal further explained that a gen-
eral principle restrains an international organization as follows:
Although some terms and conditions of employment can be
prospectively altered, the principle that fundamental and essen-
tial terms and conditions of employment cannot unilaterally be
amended is now a recognized principle, which can be regarded
as part of the law, to international organizations.  That principle
imposes a limitation on the powers of the governing bodies of
every international organization, restraining the unilateral
amendment of such terms and conditions.132
Furthermore, the 2004 report of the International Law Associa-
tion encourages international organizations to consider establish-
ing a common review mechanism of other international
administrative tribunal judgments “to achieve the greatest possible
consistency of jurisprudence in international administrative
law.”133  The report encourages international administrative tribu-
nals to take account of each other’s decisions in efforts to reduce
the risk of incompatible case law.134
129. Madhusudan v. Int’l Bank for Recon. & Dev., Decision No. 215, ¶ 25 (World Bank
Admin. Trib. Oct. 1, 1999).
130. Commentary to the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http:/
/www.imf.org/external/imfat/report.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
131. Id.
132. See Mesch v. Asian Dev. Bank, Decision No. 2, ¶¶ 15, 20 (Asian Dev. Bank Admin.
Trib. Jan. 8, 1994).
133. INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 42. R
134. Id.
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The ILO Staff Union insisted on the inclusion of generally rec-
ognized principles of international administrative law in the Stat-
ute of the ILO Administrative Tribunal.135  While the tribunal
explained that it invokes general principles where necessary, it also
did not object to the inclusion of the following sentence into the
Statute: “The Tribunal shall apply the generally recognized princi-
ples of international administrative law concerning judicial review
of administrative acts.”136  However, the statute does not currently
reflect this sentence even though over a decade has passed since
the ILO Staff Union and the ILO Administrative Tribunal reached
this general agreement.
D. Other Sources of Public International Law
According to their very nature, international organizations are
established by international treaties and governed by international
law.  As the ICJ once explained, international organizations are
subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obliga-
tion incumbent upon them under general rules of international
law, their constitutions, or international agreements to which they
are parties.137
The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organi-
zations provide that international law governs the action of an
international organization characterized as internationally wrong-
ful.138  One can draw a distinction between an international organi-
zation that breaches its human rights obligations internationally
(for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombings)
and an international organization that breaches its human rights
obligations internally (for example, discrimination of certain
employees).  It remains difficult to conceive that international
organizations, which are subjects of international law and created
by means of international law, would be designed in such a manner
to exclude the application of international law internally.  Bound
by general international human rights law, an international organi-
zation should be internationally responsible in both scenarios.  Yet,
for breaking international human rights internally, no instrument
135. Matters Relating to the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO, International Labour Office
Governing Body, 286th Sess., Doc. No. GB.286/PFA/17/2, at 2 (2003).
136. Id.
137. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt,
Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, ¶ 3.7 (Dec. 20).
138. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts, art. 5, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83, at 43
(Jan. 28, 2002).
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similar to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations exists.
When it comes to application of treaties, international adminis-
trative tribunals primarily refer to the U.N. Charter,139 interna-
tional treaties dealing with immunity,140 or the constituent
documents establishing the international organization, and the
tribunals apply international law to interpret the internal law of the
organization.141  However, sometimes tribunals explicitly state that
other international conventions do not bind an international
organization.  For example, in the Piboleau, the ILO Administrative
Tribunal explained that the ILO Maternity Protection Convention
and Recommendation does not apply to the World Health Organi-
zation.142  Following the same logic, in a separate case, the ILO
Administrative Tribunal refused to apply the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights to an international organization on the
grounds that the specific organization was not bound by that
convention.143
Indeed, traditional international treaties create rights and obli-
gations for parties to those treaties—usually States.  States then
implement the relevant international law outlined in a specific
treaty into domestic law, which in turn binds individuals.  Employ-
ees of international organizations, however, are not States or inter-
national organizations (traditional subjects of international law)
and therefore cannot be parties to and be bound by international
treaties.  In this respect, international administrative law resembles
the asymmetric nature of international investment law in which
bilateral investment treaties create internationally enforceable
rights for investors as private actors while also creating obligations
for State parties.144
Surprisingly, tribunals, including the ILO Administrative Tribu-
nal, do not refer to the ILO conventions—the most elaborated
source of traditional international labor law.145  Although these
139. See, e.g., Ms. E.S.M.S. v. UNESCO, Judgment No. 2740, at 9 (ILO Admin. Trib. July
9, 2008).
140. In re Jurado, Judgment No. 70, at 7 (ILO Admin. Trib. Sept. 11, 1964).
141. See, e.g., Stepczynski v. Sec’y-General of the United Nations, Judgment No. 64,
U.N. Admin. Trib. 365, 370 (1956).
142. In re Pibouleau, Judgment No. 351, ¶ 8 (ILO Admin. Trib. Nov. 13, 1978).
143. Miss E.E.H. v. European Patent Org., Judgment No. 2236, ¶ 11 (ILO Admin. Trib.
July 16, 2003).
144. See Kryvoi, supra note 119, at 220. R
145. At the same time, in the Desgranges judgment, the ILO Administrative Tribunal
recognized the importance of the spirit of ILO instruments.  In re Desgranges, Judgment
No. 11, (ILO Admin. Trib. Aug. 12, 1953) (“[I]t is unthinkable that the International
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conventions do not bind international organizations, they may
serve as evidence of general principles of law recognized by most
countries in the world.
E. The Practice of Organizations
The practice of organizations constitutes an additional source of
legal rights and obligations.  The Commentary on the Statute of
the IMF Administrative Tribunal, citing the de Merode deci-
sion, recognizes “the administrative practice of the organisation
[which] may, in certain circumstances, give rise to legal rights
and obligations” as one of two unwritten sources of the IMF’s inter-
nal law.146  In another case, the IMF Administrative Tribunal held
that it had to analyze the practice of the organization and certain
general principles of law to determine the respective rights and
duties of the international organization and its staff.147  The ILO
Administrative Tribunal also followed this approach.148
The practice of international organizations is similar to custom-
ary international law in that it can set standards for further organi-
zation practice.  One arbitral tribunal noted, “[T]he practice of the
organisation may also, in certain circumstances, become part of the
conditions of employment.”149  In this case, the tribunal drew a
comparison to the ICJ’s decision in the Asylum case, which
explained the need for uniform and consistent usage as a prerequi-
site for the development of international custom.150  It must be
Labour Organisation, which was established to ensure the security of all wage-earners, does
not desire to assure that of all its officials, and that the spirit in which the existing legisla-
tion should be interpreted is thus quite clear.”).
146. ADMIN. TRIB. OF THE INT’L MONETARY FUND, COMMENTARY ON THE STATUTE 18
(2009); see also Ms. “B” v. Int’l Monetary Fund, Judgment No. 1997-2, ¶ 37 (Admin. Trib.
for the Int’l Monetary Fund Dec. 23, 1997) (holding that “the administrative practice of an
organization may give rise to certain legal rights and obligations”); Mr. M. D’Aoust v. Int’l
Monetary Fund, Judgment No. 1996-1, ¶ 37 (Admin. Trib. for the Int’l Monetary Fund
Apr. 2, 1996).
147. Ms. “B”, Judgment No. 1997-2, ¶ 59 (considering whether reasonable notice of the
particular change in policy would nevertheless be required by general principles of law).
148. See In re Duberg, Judgment No. 17 (ILO Admin. Trib. Apr. 26, 1995); In re Leff,
Judgment No. 18 (ILO Admin. Trib. Apr. 26, 1955); In re Wilcox, Judgment No. 19 (ILO
Admin. Trib. 1955); In re Bernstein, Judgment No. 21 (ILO Admin. Trib. Oct. 29, 1955).
The ICJ subsequently confirmed this approach.  Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal
of the International Labour Organization upon Complaints Made Against UNESCO, Advi-
sory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 91 (Oct. 23) (ruling that the practice of considering employ-
ees hired under only fixed term contracts for renewal constituted a source of law despite
an apparent contradiction to the Staff Regulations).
149. de Merode v. World Bank, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep., Decision No. 1, ¶ 61
(1981).
150. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20).
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noted that practice of international organizations is not identical
to customary international law, which derives from interaction
between subjects of international law, namely States and interna-
tional organizations, based on the conviction that such practice
reflects a legal obligation.151  In the context of international
administrative law, the practice derives from interaction between
the organization and its employees and constitutes a separate
source of international administrative law.
F. Municipal Law
Municipal law usually does not constitute a source of law applied
by international administrative tribunals.  Nonetheless, in some
instances, internal law of an organization may directly incorporate
municipal law.  For instance, the internal law of the international
organization may refer to local laws on social security, taxes,152
workers’ compensation,153 or visa issues.154  Internal law of interna-
tional organizations or employment contracts may also contain ref-
erences to local law.155
The ILO Administrative Tribunal explained the application of
municipal law as follows:
[T]he Tribunal has never ruled out municipal law a priori.
Although it is ordinarily and essentially competent in a context
of international law, it may well have to heed some provisions of
municipal law where, as indeed in this case, there is renvoi to
such law in a contract of service or in an organisation’s rules.
Precedent further has it that there may be reference to munici-
pal law for the sake of comparison and so as to educe certain
151. See, e.g., Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 91.
In de Merode, the tribunal stated:
Obviously, the organisation would be discouraged from taking measures favour-
able to its employees on an ad hoc basis if each time it did so it had to take the
risk of initiating a practice which might become legally binding upon it. The inte-
gration of practice into the conditions of employment must therefore be limited
to that of which there is evidence that it is followed by the organisation in the
conviction that it reflects a legal obligation, as was recognised by the International
Court of Justice.
de Merode, Decision No. 1, ¶ 23 (also citing Effects of Awards, 1954 I.C.J. 53, 91).
152. See, e.g., J.C. Peter Richardson v. Int’l Bank for Recon. & Dev., Decision No. 208, ¶
2 (World Bank Admin. Trib. May 14, 1999).
153. For example, World Bank Staff Rule 6.11, ¶ 2.01 provides for the application of
the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act of 1998. WORLD BANK STAFF MANUAL
(1983), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSTAFFMANUAL/Resources/
StaffManual_WB_web.pdf.
154. See, e.g., Safari O’Humay v. Int’l Bank for Recon. & Dev., Decision No. 140, ¶ 12
(World Bank Admin. Trib. Oct. 14, 1994).
155. See, e.g., WORLD BANK STAFF MANUAL, supra note 153, ¶ 3.01. R
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general principles of law that apply to the international civil
service.156
Municipal law also helps to define concepts stemming from
other legal systems, such as marriage, adoption, divorce, or resi-
dence,157 and as discussed in the ILO Administrative Tribunal’s
statement above, it may also give rise to general principles of law.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF A NORMATIVE HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Hierarchy in Statutes of International Administrative Tribunals
Under a hierarchical legal structure, a subordinate norm must
yield to a superior norm in the case of a conflict.  Domestic legal
systems maintain a settled hierarchy of norms with constitutions at
the top of the hierarchy.158  It would be natural for lawyers coming
from any jurisdiction to expect a similar hierarchy of norms in the
internal order of international organizations.  However, constitu-
ent documents of the oldest and largest international administra-
tive tribunals contain no such provisions outlining either the
sources of law or the hierarchy between international law and an
international organization’s internal law.159  Even the Statute of the
U.N. Dispute Tribunal adopted in 2009 merely provides that its
judgments “state the reasons, facts and law on which they are
based,” without providing any guidance on the applicable sources
of law.160
156. In re Kock, Judgment No. 1450, ¶ 19 (ILO Admin. Trib. July 6, 1995).
157. See Felice Morgenstern, The Law Applicable to International Officials, 18 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 739, 746–50 (1969).
158. See, e.g., The Legislative Hierarchy, EGYPTIAN REG. REFORM & DEV. ACTIVITY (Jan. 8,
2012), http://www.errada.gov.eg/index_en.php?op=show_feature_details_en&id=13.
159. See, e.g., Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organ-
ization art. X, adopted Oct. 9, 1946, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribu
nal/about/statute.htm; Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Mone-
tary Fund (2009), available at https://www.imf.org/external/imfat/pdf/2009_Amended-
Statute.pdf; Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, International Development Association, and International
Finance Corporation (Apr. 30, 1980); Statute of the United Nations Appeals Tribunal, G.A.
Res. 63/253, supra note 94. R
160. Statute of the United Nations Appeals Tribunal, G.A. Res. 63/253, supra note 94, R
art. 11.  The duty to give reasons ensures that the judge knows how to weigh various inter-
ests at stake and that the judge uses his powers to achieve a just end. See Benedict Kings-
bury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 39
(2005); see also Giacinto della Cananea, Maximum Standards of Procedural Justice in Adminis-
trative Adjudication, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 67,
67 (Stephan Schill ed., 2010).
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However, some international organizations do stipulate the
applicable sources of law.  For example, the Rules of Procedure of
the Administrative Tribunal of the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD) provide that the tribunal shall base
its decisions on “the provisions of the Staff Member’s contract of
employment, the internal law of the Bank and generally recognised
principles of international administrative law.”161  Moreover, the
Statute of the EBRD Administrative Tribunal provides for the
supremacy of international law over the internal law of the EBRD
by establishing that decisions of the Board of Directors or the
Board of Governors should not breach international administrative
law.162
Unlike the Statute of the EBRD Administrative Tribunal, how-
ever, the Statute of the IMF Administrative Tribunal requires that
the latter tribunal “apply the internal law of the [IMF], including
generally recognized principles of international administrative law
concerning judicial review of administrative acts.”163  It is interest-
ing to note that while the EBRD considers general principles of
international administrative law as something separate from its
internal law, the IMF considers such general principles as part of
its internal law.  The official commentary to Article III of the Stat-
ute of the IMF Administrative Tribunal sets out a hierarchy of the
internal law of the organization164 and its relation to general prin-
ciples of international administrative law as follows:
To the extent that a tribunal’s decision is dependent on the par-
ticular law of the organization in question (such as the precise
language of a staff regulation), the decision would be regarded
as specific to the organization in question and not part of the
general principles of international administrative law.165
Furthermore, the official commentary notes that an administra-
tive tribunal applying general principles of international adminis-
trative law “cannot derogate from the powers conferred on the
161. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Administrative Tribunal
Statute and Rules of Procedure, Rule 3.02, available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/
integrity/appeals.pdf.
162. See id. Rule 8.03.
163. Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Monetary Fund, art. III
(2009), available at https://www.imf.org/external/imfat/pdf/2009_Amended-Statute.pdf.
164. See Commentary to the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International
Monetary Fund, available at http://www.imf.org/external/imfat/report.htm.  With respect
to formal sources of law, insofar as the Executive Board derives its authority from the Arti-
cles of Agreement, the Executive Board’s decisions must be consistent with the Articles as a
higher authority of law.  Likewise, the Executive Board is also bound by resolutions of the
Board of Governors as the highest organ of the Fund. Id.
165. Id.
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organs of the [IMF], including the Executive Board, under the
Articles of Agreement.”166  In other words, the internal law of the
IMF is superior to general principles of international administra-
tive law.  Clearly, the statutes of the EBRD and the IMF administra-
tive tribunals follow different approaches toward the hierarchy
between international law and the internal law of international
organizations.
Several other international administrative tribunals uphold the
importance of general principles of international administrative
law.  On more than one occasion, the World Bank Administrative
Tribunal has reviewed the legality of actions taken by the legislative
body of the World Bank.  For example, in de Merode, the World
Bank Administrative Tribunal recognized that the World Bank
could not violate the principle of nonretroactivity due to its funda-
mental nature.  Similarly, the Appeals Board of the European
Launcher Development Organisation also explained that employ-
ment contract provisions cannot contradict the general principle
of nondiscrimination.167  Therefore, certain general principles,
such as nondiscrimination and the notion that an organization
cannot reduce one’s salary, are fundamental.168
One ILO Administrative Tribunal decision explained that a right
derived “from a general principle . . . must be respected even
where contrary provisions exist or in the absence of any explicit
text.”169  Nevertheless, some tribunals remain reluctant to nullify
internal law enactments on the basis of conflict with fundamental
norms of international administrative law.170  One reason for the
reluctance could be that the tribunals want to show respect for an
international organization’s legislative procedures.  However,
other tribunals boldly recognize fundamental norms that interna-
tional organizations cannot violate, such as nonretroactivity and
166. Id.
167. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 40, at 296; see also Ms. N. Sachdev v. Int’l Monetary R
Fund, Judgment No. 2012-1, ¶ 150 (Admin. Trib. for the Int’l Monetary Fund Mar. 6,
2012) (noting that it was “permissible that the selection process, which was taken together
with the World Bank for a position in a joint Bank/Fund office, not follow the precise
requirements of the Fund’s written law as long as the process met standards of fairness
consistent with generally recognized principles of international administrative law.”).
168. AMERASINGHE, supra note 40, at 789. R
169. In re Ferrechia, Judgment No. 203 (ILO Admin. Trib. May 14, 1973) (discussing
the right to participate in the examination of evidence).
170. Mullan v. Sec’y-General of the United Nations, Judgment No. 162, U.N. Admin.
Trib. 387, 389 (1972).
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nondiscrimination.171  The main challenge moving forward will be
to define the aims of such principles, which could prove to be diffi-
cult as not all legal systems share the same legal culture and
tradition.172
B. Toward Supremacy of International Law
Under a legal hierarchy, every action and enactment of the inter-
national organization must respect higher-ranking norms.  Article
38 of the ICJ Statute, the most respected list of the sources of inter-
national law,173 provides that international conventions, general
principles of law, and international customary law serve as primary
sources of international law, while judicial decisions and scholarly
writings serve as subsidiary means to determine international
law.174  Despite this articulation, international administrative tribu-
nals never refer to Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.175
Although Article 103 of the U.N. Charter explicitly provides that
obligations under the Charter shall prevail over any obligations of
U.N. member States,176 under other international agreements, the
ICJ Statute does not establish a hierarchy of sources of interna-
tional law.  The ICJ Statute merely suggests the order in which a
tribunal should consider each source: if the solution is found in a
treaty, a tribunal should not refer to custom, but if no such custom
or treaty exists, then the adjudicator must resort to general princi-
ples of law.177  This order goes from the most special rules to the
most general ones, reflects the decreasing ease of proof, and
reflects preference to sources in which consent of States is better
articulated.178  The same logic can apply to international adminis-
trative law—in the absence of relevant treaties of customary inter-
171. See, e.g., de Merode v. World Bank, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep., Decision No. 1,
¶ 61 (1981).
172. However, the same argument would apply to the force of international law gener-
ally, such as the U.N. Charter, which is primarily based on the Western legal tradition.
173. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 36
(7th ed. 1997) (stating that Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute “is usually accepted as constitut-
ing a list of the sources of international law”).
174. ICJ Statute, supra note 2, art. 38. R
175. AMERASINGHE, supra note 40, at 283. R
176. U.N. Charter art. 103.
177. Pellet, supra note 109, ¶ 271. R
178. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, La pratique de l’article 38 du Statut de la Cour internationale de
Justice dans le cadre des plaidoiries ecrites et orales, in COLLECTION OF ESSAYS BY LEGAL ADVISERS
OF STATES, LEGAL ADVISORS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND PRACTITIONERS IN THE
FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 377, 381, 388 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/law/
books/CollectionOfEssaysByLegalAdvisers.pdf.
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national law, adjudicators should resort to general principles of
law.
According to Hersch Lauterpacht, a specific treaty overrides
international customary law and even general principles of law,
and it may also depart from a general treaty binding on the parties,
subject to certain limitations.179  Lauterpacht argues that because
treaties and custom hold the first place in the hierarchy of interna-
tional legal sources, a tribunal should interpret them against gen-
eral principles of law.180  However, because treaties and custom
result from interaction of States rather than interaction between
international organizations and their employees, treaty application
in international administrative law is questionable.  Moreover,
international organizations themselves are rarely parties to treaties.
While the supremacy of constituent documents of international
organizations over other internal law is widely recognized, this is
not the case with the supremacy of general international law over
the internal law of international organizations.  One author sug-
gests, “[T]he general principles of law yield to the written
sources.”181  On the other hand, others believe that general princi-
ples of law usually prevail over a conflicting written internal law of
the organization.182  Some argue that every internal regulation of
an international organization must conform to general principles
of international administrative law and any other applicable norms
of general public international law.183  In other words, the practice
of an international organization cannot override a fundamental
general principle of law, such as the prohibition against
discrimination.
A number of international legal instruments support the
supremacy of international law over the internal law of interna-
tional organizations.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties provides that “an international organization party to a treaty
may not invoke the rules of the organization as justification for its
failure to perform the treaty.”184  Further, Article 32(d) of the
Draft Articles of Responsibility of International Organizations pro-
vides, “[T]he responsible international organization may not rely
179. 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 87
(Elihu Lauterpacht ed. 1970).
180. Id. at 244.
181. HENRY SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY
WITHIN DIVERSITY 390 (2011); AKEHURST supra note 90, at 80. R
182. AMERASINGH, supra note 40, at 296. R
183. DUPUY, supra note 88, at 245 (1988). R
184. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 85, art. 27. R
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on its rules as justification for failure to comply with its obligations
under this Part.”185  Although these Articles do not address an
international organization’s obligations vis-a`-vis its employees but
rather deal with traditional subjects of international public law,186
no reason exists as to why the same principle cannot apply to
employment relations.187  The main issue in establishing such a
hierarchy with respect to international administrative law is decid-
ing which norms occupy the highest hierarchical position.
The ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case suggested in a well-known
dictum that “basic rights of the human person” create obligations
erga omnes, which are more important to the international legal
order.188  The case provided several examples of such erga omnes
rules, including the “protection from slavery and racial
discrimination.”189
Certain obligations bind all subjects of international law for the
purposes of maintaining the fundamental values of the interna-
tional community.190  These include obligations concerning the
protection of basic human rights.191  As treaties attract nearly uni-
185. Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 4, art. R
32(d).  This provision mirrors Article 27 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts. See also Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, supra note 138. R
186. According to Article 33 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts, the international organization may owe obligations to one or
more States, to one or more organizations, or to the international community as a whole.
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 138,
art. 33.
187. Drawing an analogy to the hierarchy of rules within E.U. law proves useful.  The
principle of constitutional legality under E.U. law establishes that each act attributable to
the European Union should not contradict higher-ranking law.  Armin von Bogdandy,
Neither an International Organisation nor a Nation State: The EU as a Supranational Federation, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 761, 763 (Erik Jones et al. eds., 2012).
For example, the practice of individual E.U. institutions cannot change the primary law of
the European Union.  Case 68/86, United Kingdom v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 855, ¶ 24.
188. See Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4,
33–34 (Feb. 5).  For a discussion of what constitutes fundamental rights under various
instruments, see Theodore Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1, 5–11 (1986).
189. Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co., Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. at 32.  However, there is no
agreement as to which human rights norms constitute such superior norms, with the
exception of a few norms, including genocide, torture, and slavery.  For a discussion on
this topic, see Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT’L L. 413 (1983).
190. M. Giorgio Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law, 71 INST. INT’L L.
Y.B., no. 2, 2005, at 286, 287.
191. Id.
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versal ratification, it is often assumed that the principles they con-
tain have achieved the status of customary international law.192
One set of principles, which nearly all jurisdictions recognized as
fundamental,193 is contained in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fun-
damental Principles and Rights at Work.194  These principles
include freedom of association, the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining, elimination of all forms of forced
and compulsory labor, effective abolition of child labor, and the
elimination of employment discrimination.195  It is argued that
these principles should prevail over conflicting internal law of
international organizations.
A hierarchy of norms of international administrative law, with
international law holding the highest hierarchical position, will
help to prevent proliferation of poor quality international adminis-
trative case law.  Furthermore, it will send a message to interna-
tional organizations that the international community will not
tolerate a breach of such rights guaranteed under general interna-
tional law.  An establishment of a hierarchy will thereby help
develop the international administrative legal system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current system of international administrative law does not
constitute a hierarchically-ordered model.  Ascertaining the neces-
sary degree of conflict between international law and internal law
may prove exceedingly difficult, particularly when the superior law,
namely general international law, is so amorphous.  To remain nor-
mative, international administrative law must have a formalized
standardization based on the supremacy of international law.196
The current pluralist model of international administrative law
fails to offer a degree of legal certainty.  Clarifying the relevant
sources and setting up a hierarchy between internal law and inter-
192. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 100 (2006).
193. NORMLEX, Ratification by Convention, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12001:0::NO::: (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).  The number of rati-
fication ranges from the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 1999 (No. 182) with
178 ratifications to 152 ratifications for Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right
Convention, 1999 (No. 182). Id.
194. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted June 18,
1988, available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang—
en/index.htm.
195. Id.
196. D’ASPREMONT, supra note 44, at 30. R
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national law could diminish the space available for politics and
unlimited discretion.
As a system of law completely detached from domestic legal sys-
tems, international administrative law is a purely international
creature.  However, not all sources of law applied by international
administrative tribunals qualify as international public law in a
strict sense of this term.  Internal regulations of organizations, deci-
sions of an organization’s highest governing body, and an individ-
ual’s employment contract clearly give rise to rights and
obligations of employees and intergovernmental organizations.
However, these do not constitute sources of public international
law, and their role should be subordinate to international public
law sensu stricto, backed by the legitimacy of the international law-
making process.
International conventions and customary international law pro-
vide the most appropriate means to determine the rights and obli-
gations of international organizations.  Yet, it is difficult to locate
directly applicable rights and obligations of employees in these
instruments.  Although international organizations are rarely par-
ties to international treaties related to human rights and labor stan-
dards, they may be bound by the general principles of law
articulated in them.  General principles of law play an important
role as a source of law both for employees and for international
organizations.  Similarly, decisions of other tribunals and the teach-
ings of the most highly qualified scholars of the various nations
should serve as subsidiary means to determine rules of law.
Rules of international public law, including procedural and sub-
stantive general principles of international law, should prevail over
any conflicting internal law of international organizations.  While
some international organizations explicitly recognize this hierarchy
in their statutes, others remain reluctant to do so.  Administrative
tribunals have started to recognize this principle in their jurispru-
dence, albeit without any reference to the theory of public interna-
tional law.  An established hierarchy of sources will make
international administrative law more coherent and predictable
and will ensure greater procedural equality between international
organizations and international civil servants.
To achieve this hierarchy, administrative tribunals can clarify the
sources of law applicable to disputes and outline the normative
hierarchy.  International organizations should also consider follow-
ing the example of the EBRD Administrative Tribunal, which
defined the sources of applicable law and established supremacy of
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international administrative law over conflicting internal law of the
organization.197  Finally, the International Law Commission could
codify general principles of international administrative law, simi-
lar to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations, as this will explicitly establish the supremacy of such
principles over the internal law of international organizations.
197. See EBRD, Administrative Tribunal Statute and Rules of Procedure, available at
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/integrity/appeals.pdf.
